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By the weight of American authority, if a chattel be brought into a state
without the assent of the non-resident owner of a valid title interest therein,
the state into which the chattel is removed will refuse to divest his title save
by reason of his own voluntary act. If A in Arkansas takes from B a chat-
tel mortgage, or executes to B a conditional sale, of an automobile or any
other tangible chattel, and B then removes the chattel into Missouri and
later sells it there to a bona fide purchaser P, A's non-possessory interest
being unrecorded in Missouri, the effect of the later transaction upon A's
prior title will probably depend upon whether he assented, expressly or
impliedly, to the removal of the chattel. If he did assent, he will be bound
by the Missouri law which destroys unrecorded interests in favor of bona
fide purchasers;' if he did not assent, the Missouri law will be held not to
have affected his interest.2 Most of the American states would reach the
same result as does Missouri on this set of facts, at least in the case in which
A did not assent to the removal of the chattel into the second state.,
Several states would, however, reach the opposite result. If the chattel were
instead removed from Arkansas to Texas, and there sold to the bona fide
purchaser P, the law of Texas would declare that P acquired a title superior
to A's regardless of whether A had assented to the removal or not.4 Some
*Visiting Professor of Law, University of Missouri; School of Law, University
of Arkansas. The author wishes to acknowledge substantial aid from Martin Rich-
ardson, third year law student in the University of Missouri, in collecting many of
the cases herein cited.
1. Geiser Mfg. Co. v. Todd, 204 S. W. 287 (Mo. App. 1918), 224 S. W. 1006(Mo. App. 1920); Adamson v. Fogelstrom, 221 Mo. App. 1243, 300 S. W. 841(1927).
2. Nat. Bank. of Commerce v. Morris, 114 Mo. 255, 21 S. W. 511, 19 L. R. A.
463 (1893); Schmidt v. Rankin, 193 Mo. 254, 91 S. W. 78 (1906); Note (1921) 22
U. OF Mo. BULL. LAW SER. 31.
3. Bealejurisdiction over Title of Absent Owner in a Chattel (1927) 40
HAt v. L. REv. 805; Carnahan, Tangible Property and the Conflict of Laws (1935)
2 UNrV. oF Cur. L. REv. 345; Note (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 1293. Some states do
not apply their recording acts to any interests arising outside the state. See infra
note 40.
4. Farmer v. Evans, 111 Tex. 283, 233 S. W. 101 (1921); Gen. Motors Acc.
Corp. v. Fowler, 36 S. W. (2d) 589 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
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other states in the position of Texas would reach the same result.5 This con-
dition of the law at once suggests a further problem. Suppose that after pur-
chasing the chattel in Texas, P in turn removes it to Missouri, where A brings
suit against him to recover it. Are the Missouri courts free to hold, as they
would in the case first put, that one (A) who owns an interest in a chattel
will not be deprived of it by the law of a state to which he has not voluntarily
submitted his interest in it by assenting to its presence there, or must the
courts of Missouri, or of any other state in which the issue thereafter arises,
recognize as valid the title which the law of Texas has created in P? That is
the question to which this article is ultimately directed.
GENERAL RULE-LAw OF SITUs GOVERNS
It has now become well settled at the common law that the existence or
non-existence of any title in a chattel, whether it be absolute ownership or
the slightest non-possessory interest, is determined by the law of the place
where the chattel was physically located at the time the title, if any, was
created. The old notion that the law of the owner's domicile determined what
interests arose in his tangible chattels6 is now so thoroughly repudiated that
it does not merit further discussion.7 The law of the place where the chattel is
situated determines whether title passes on a purported sale, 8 whether an al-
leged chattel mortgage is valid,9 what interests if any arise by reason of a
5. Infra notes 44-49, inclusive.
6. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1841) 308. Due largely to Story's
influence, a few American cases have said that mobilia sequuntur personam. See
Minor v. Cardwell, 37 Mo. 350 (1866); Edgerly v. Bush 81 N. Y. 199 (1880). These
statements are today explained as dicta merely.
7. Beale, Jurisdiction over Title of Absent Owner in a Chattel, supra note 3;
Carnahan, Tangible Property and the Conflict of Laws, supra note 3.
8. Cammell v. Sewell, 5 H. & N. (Ex.) 728 (1860); Schmidt v. Perkins, 74
N. J. L. 785, 67 At. 77, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1007 (1907); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1934) §§ 255-258.
9. Roach v. St. Louis Type Foundry, 21 Mo. App. 118 (1886); Brown v.
Koenig, 99 Mo. App. 653, 74 S. W. 407 (1903); Youssoupoff v. Widener, 246 N. Y.
174, 158 N. E. 64 (1927); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 265; Ireland,
Conflict of Laws As to Chattel Mortgages in Louisiana (1936) 10 TULANE L. REV.
275. Of course, the validity of the mortgage may in turn depend upon the validity
of the alleged debt secured by it, which may be controlled by the law of the place of
contracting rather than the situs of the security. Trower Bros. Co. v. Hamilton, 179
Mo. 205, 77 S. W. 1081 (1904). See Note (1923) 57 A. L. R. 702.
10. Corbett v. Riddle, 209 Fed. 811 (C. C. A. 4th, 1913); Morris v. Cohn, 55
Ark. 401, 17 S. W. 342 (1891); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 272;
Notes (1923) 25 A. L. R. 1153; (1928) 57 A. L. R. 535; (1933) 87 A. L. R. 1308.
Cf. Enterprise Optical Mfg. Co. v. Timmer, 71 Fed. (2) 295 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934),
pointing out that though the conditional seller's interest arising at the situs will be
recognized elsewhere as valid, it may nevertheless be given some other name at the
forum.
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conditional sale,10 the efficacy of an asignment for the benefit of creditors,:1
the validity of trusts or of other equitable interests'12 created either by opera-
tion of law or the acts of the parties, and of gifts, 3 the existence and aban-
donment of all kinds of liens and pledges,' 4 the creation of powers,15 rights
acquired by attaching creditors and purchasers at execution sale,'6 and the
existence or non-existence of all other rights in rem in chattels.' 7 Also, tangi-
ble chattels are taxable only at their situs.'8
It is true, of course, that there are a number of situations remain-
ing in the law in which, for the sake of convenience, reference is still made to
the law of the owner's domicile to determine what interests arise in chattels
upon certain events. For example, it is the general rule that, on a person's
death, the succession to his movable property is governed by the law of his
domicile, as is also the validity of a will of his movables. 9 This is deemed a
11. Smith v. Jones, 63 Ark. 232, 37 S. W. 1052 (1896); Brown v. Knox, 6 Mo.
302 (1840). Most American states will recognize the validity, as to chattels within
their borders, or an assignment validly made in another state, but they reserve the
right not to do so. See Barnett v. Kinney, 147 U. S. 476 (1893); Security Trust Co.
v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 173 U. S. 624 (1899); Einer v. Deynoodt, 39 Mo. 69 (1866),
reaffirming Einer v. Beste, 32 Mo. 240 (1862); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1934) §§ 263, 264.
12. In Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65 (1933), 89 A. L. R.
1007 (1934), the court emphasized the law of the situs and that "intended" by
the parties, which coincided, as governing. See People's Loan & Inv. Co. v. Univer-
sal Cr. Co., 75 F. (2d) 545 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) (trust receipts); RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 294. The rule as to voluntary trusts inter vivos is not
yet clearly established by the decisions. The creation of constructive or resulting
trusts has always been deemed to be governed by the law of the situs of the res.
Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314 (1848); Cooper v. Standley, 40 Mo. App. 138 (1890).
13. Emery v. Clough, 63 N. H. 552, 4 At. 796, 56 Am. Rep. 543 (1885).
14. Claflin v. Mayer, 41 La. Ann. 1048, 7 So. 139 (1889) (vendor's privilege);
First Nat. Bk. v. Barse Co., 61 Mo. App. 143 (1895); Everett v. Barse Co., 115 Mo.
App. 482, 88 S. W. 165 (1905); Sample v. Live Stock Comm. Co., 193 Mo. App. 670,
186 S. W. 1125 (1916); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 279.
15. C. T. Dougherty Co. v. Krimke, 105 N. J. L. 470, 144 Ad. 617 (1929);
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §§ 283, 284.
16. Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139 (1868); Hervey v. R. I. Locomotive
Works, 93 U. S. 664 (1876).
17. There is some question as to whether rights of foreclosure and redemption,
the privilege of a conditional seller to repossess the article sold, and the like, are
ights in the res itself, or contractual rights, or possibly remedial only. See Frank-
lin Motor Car Co. v. Hamilton, 113 Me. 63, 92 At. 1001 (1915); T. G. Jewett, Jr.,
Inc. v. Keystone Driller Co., 282 Mass. 469, 185 N. E. 369 (1933); American Hoist
& Derrick Co. v. Trustee & Registrar Corp., 27 S. W. (2d) 437 (Mo. App. 1930).
See Comment (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 323; Note (1930) 69 A. L. R . 622.
18. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925); City Bank Farmers' Tr. Co.
v. Schnader, 293 U. S. 112 (1934).
19. Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400 (1852); Hewitt v. Cox, 55 Ark. 225, 15 S.
W. 1026, 17 S. W. 873 (1891); Moultrie v. Hunt, 23 N. Y. 394 (1861); RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §§ 303, 306; Note (1934) 88 A. L. R. 861. A
number of states have statutes establishing the common law rule. See Mo. REv.
STAT. (1929) §§ 254 ff.
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good rule because it establishes uniformity in distribution of what is essen-
tially one estate to a group of heirs (distributees) who will thereby avoid un-
fair preferences among themselves. That it is not the domicile, however, but
rather the law of the situs of each particular item in the movable estate, which
has ultimate control over the distribution, is illustrated by the fact that the
situs of any particular tangible movable res can insist upon applying to it the
law of distribution of the situs as against the law of the domicile.20 It is the
law of the situs which basically governs, though by the law of Conflict of
Laws of most American states, the situs voluntarily refers questions of dis-
tribution of decedents' estates to the law of each decedent's domicile.21
The situation is the same as to matrimonial property interests. The
general rule is well settled that when a man or woman, either or both of whom
owns movable property in various places, become married to each other, their
marital interests in each other's goods are fixed as to all the movables wher-
ever located by the law of the husband's domicile22 at the time of marriage.2
This seems desirable, since all the goods really constitute a single body of
property, as far as the spouses' interests are concerned, and the law selected is
the only one under which the scattered mass of goods can be conveniently
treated as a unit. But the Missouri court in Locke v. McPherso, 4 clearly
demonstrated that the general rule is to be applied only as the law of the situs
says that it shall be. In that case a Missouri woman owning Missouri mov-
ables married a New York domiciliary, then died. Her domicile was admitted-
ly changed to New York. The court in effect held that the husband's interest
in the wife's goods was only such as was given him by Missouri law. Doubt-
less it was moved by a local public policy favoring the liberal Missouri Mar-
20. Two states do this by statute. ILL. REV. STATS., ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1929)
c. 6, § 7; id c. 39, § 1; Miss. CODE, ANN. (1930) § 1401. And see Locke v. McPher-
son, 163 Mo. 493, 63 S. W. 726, 52 L. R. A. 420 (1901); Matter of Chappell, 124
Wash. 128, 213 Pac. 684 (1923), in which the result was reached without statute.
21. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 303.2; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1927) 368. And see City Bank Farmers' Tr. Co. v. Schnader, 293 U. S. 112
(1934): "The power to regulate the transmission, administration and distribution of
tangible personal property rests exclusively in the State in which the property has
an actual situs, regardless of the domicile of the owner.... New York (domiciliary)
laws had no bearing other than that attributable to their implied adoption by Penn-
sylvania (situs)."
22. A few cases say the "matrimonial domicile" but this has always been
discovered to be the same as the husband's domicile. Fisher v. Fisher, 2 La. Ann. 774
(1847); Percy v. Percy, 9 La. Ann. 185 (1854); STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed.
1841) § 146.
23. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 289; Leflar, Community
Property and Conflict of Laws (1933) 21 CALIF. L. REV. 221, 224.
24. 263 Mo. 493, 63 S. W. 726, 52 L. R. A. 420 (1901).
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ned Women's Property Act as against the old common law rule, still oper-
ative in New York, which practically gave a married woman's entire movable
estate to her husband. Clearly, the Missouri court had power to decide as it
did, since Missouri was the situs of the movables.
Likewise for the sake of uniformity of marital interests as between the
spouses themselves (they being the only ones directly concerned) it is usually
held that the nature of their common ownership in chattels acquired during
the marriage is fixed by the law of their domicile2 5 rather than by the law of
the situs of each individual item of goods, but again the law of the situs is
ultimately controlling and, though it ordinarily refers the question to the
law of domicile, it may and sometimes does insist upon determining marital
property interests in accordance with its own substantive rules.26
The underlying power of the situs is emphasized by the two recent Unit-
ed States Supreme Court decisions in the cases of Clark v. Williard. In the
first decision, 7 it was declared that an Iowa judicial proceeding vesting title
to all the assets owned by an Iowa corporation, including some in Montana,
in a "statutory successor," was entitled to full faith and credit in Montana.
Then the Montana Supreme Court announced that by the law of that state
(the situs), buttressed by a "strong local public policy" there, the Montana
assets were still subject to execution by Montana judgment creditors of the
defunct corporation.2 8 The second decision29 of the federal Supreme Court,
on the same facts, virtually stated that since Montana was the situs it had
the power to do what it did, regardless of the wisdom of its policy. The prin-
cipal analogy cited in support of the decision was to the cases involving as-
signments for the benefit of creditors,30 which solve a similar problem in the
same fashion.
REMOVAL OF CHATTELS AcRoss STATE LINES
The mere removal of goods across a state line does not change property
interests in the goods. If A is the owner of an automobile located in Arkansas,
or has a chattel mortgage on it, or a conditional seller's interest in it, or an
25. Nelson v. Goree's Adm'r., 34 Ala. 565 (1859); Snyder v. Stringer, 116
Wash. 131, 198 Pac. 733 (1921); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 290;
Leflar, Community Property and Conflict of Laws (1933) 21 CALIF. L. REV. 221,
230.
26. Shumway v. Leakey, 67 Cal. 458, 8 Pac. 12 (1885); Gooding Mill. & Elev.
Co. v. Lincoln County State Bk., 22 Idaho 468, 126 Pac. 772 (1912); Smith v.
McAtee, 27 Md. 420 (1867).
27. Clark v. Williard, 292 U. S. 112 (1934).
28. Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co., 97 Mont. 503, 34 P. (2d) 982 (1934).
29. Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211 (1935).
30. See supra note 11.
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equitable title to it, or any lesser interest, possessory or non-possessory, hav-
ing the character of an ownership, the physical transfer of the res into Mis-
souri or any other state will not destroy A's interest, whether the transfer is
with A's assent or without it. There is very little disagreement among the au-
thorities on this.3 1 Occasionally a court has said that it would refuse to recog-
nize some interest created under the law of another state, but almost invari-
ably an analysis of the actual facts before the court in each particular case
will reveal that the new interest which was recognized in place of the old
arose out of some new transaction concerning the chattel after its removal.3 -
Typical of such new transactions are bona fide purchases and levies by at-
taching creditors. It is obvious in such cases that the old interest persisted
31. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §§ 260 (general), 266-67 (chat-
tel mortgages), 273-74 (conditional sales), 280 (liens and pledges), 291-93 (marital
property); Fuller v. Webster, 5 Boyce 538, 95 At]. 335 (1915) (Pennsylvania bonafide purchaser's interest recognized in Del. though it could not have arisen there);
Newman v. Wilson, 1 La. Ann. 48 (1846) (Mississippi sheriff's lien good in Louis-
iana); Fears v. Sykes, 35 Miss. 633 (1858) (title gained by adverse possession, then
chattel removed); Robertson v. Staed, 135 Mo. 135, 36 S. W. 610 (1896) (Mexi-
can receiver's title good in Mo.); Cooper v. Phila. Worsted Co., 68 N. J. Eq. 622, 60
Atl. 352 (1905 (Pennsylvania bailor's interest not decreased by removal of goods
to New Jersey, though by New Jersey law he would have been only a conditional
seller); C. T. Dougherty Co. v. Krimke, 105 N. J. L. 470, 144 Atl. 617 (1929) (power
created by New York law exercisable in New Jersey); Born v. Shaw, 29 Pa. 288,
72 Am. Dec. 633 (1857) (Virginia title good in Pennsylvania, though same title
would not have arisen in Pennsylvania); Cagill v. Wooldridge, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 580
(1876) (receiver's Arkansas title good in Tennessee); Phillips v. Eggert, 145 Wis.
43, 129 N. W. 654, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 132, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1112 (1911) (sheriff's
lien valid though goods removed to another state). There are a great many cases
to this general effect, but those cited are fair examples. Contra: Forgan v. Bain-
bridge, 34 Ariz.408,274 Pac. 155 (1928).
32. Walworth v. Harris, 129 U. S. 355 (1889) (Arkansas landlord's lien
defeated by subsequent factor's lien in Louisiana); Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364,
201 Pac. 887 (1921), 25 A. L. R. 1149 (1923) (Utah "secret lien" defeated by bonafide purchase in Colorado); Union Securities Co. v. Adams, 33 Wyo. 45, 236 Pac.
513 (1925), 50 A. L. R. 23 (1927) (Wyoming bona fide purchaser prevails over
"objectionable" Texas title).
In a few cases it is said that a statutory lien arising under the law of one state
will not be recognized in another state. Marsh's Adm'r v. Elsworth, 37 Ala. 85
(1860); Merrick & Fenno v. Avery, Wayne & Co., 14 Ark. 370 (1854); Woodward
v. Roane, 23 Ark. 523 (1861); Gause v. Bullard, 16 La. Ann. 107 (1861). In these
cases also it appears that there was regularly some new transaction in the second
state efficient to defeat a recognized lien. Apart from that, it would sometimes
be true that the statute creating the lien would create it as an interest valid
and enforceable only in the state of its creation, as is generally said to be
true of powers created by operation of law. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1934) § 282. Cf. C. T. Dougherty Co. v. Krimke, 105 N. J. L. 470, 144 At. 617
(1929}. And the cases might be explained on the theory that even though the lien
was recognized as valid, the law of the second state afforded no appropriate remedy
for enforcement of the foreign statutory right.
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after the chattel was brought into the second state, and was defeated only by
the new transaction the effect of which upon the title was determined by the
law of the then situs of the chattel, the second state.
The principle is well exemplified by the removal of goods subject to.
matrimonial property interests from a community property state to a com-
mon law state, or vice versa. If H and W, husband and wife, own goods by
the community in Louisiana, then bring them into Missouri, their common
ownership persists. It will persist, perhaps in the form of a joint tenancy
which is as near as Missouri can come to an equivalent of the community,
even after the goods are reinvested in other valuable things in Missouri,33
though Missouri could hold that new types of interests developed out of the
Missouri transaction. By the same token, if one of the spouses takes separate
property with him from Missouri to California, it remains separate property
after it is taken into the community state even though it would have been
community property had it first been acquired there.34 Possibly it might be-
come community property by means of new dealings subsequent to its arrival
in California, but that is a different matter.35
Thus it is seen that as a matter of common law the removal of chattels
across state lines does not affect property interests in them.386 Suppose, how-
ever, that some state undertook to change this rule, and to declare that cer-
33. Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314 (1848); Edwards v. Edwards, 108 Okla. 93,
233 Pac. 477 (1925). And see Parrott v. Nimmo 28 Ark. 351 (1873); Goldsoll v.
Chatham Nat. Bk., 80 Mo. 626 (1883); State ex rel. Cunningham v. Carroll, 6 Mo.
App. 263 (1878); State to use of Grabinsky v. Smit, 20 Mo. App. 50 (1885);
McClain v. Abshire, 72 Mo. App. 390 (1897).
34. Stephen v. Stephen, 36 Ariz. 235, 284 Pac. 158 (1930); Re Thornton, 1
Cal. (2d) 1, 33 P. (2d) 1, 92 A. L. R. 1343 (1934); Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho
336, 125 Pac. 796 (1912); Young v. Templeton, 4 La. Ann. 254 (1849); Bosma v.
Harder, 94 Ore. 219, 185 Pac. 741 (1919); Oliver v. Robertson, 41 Tex. 422 (1874);
Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914, 13 Ann. Cas. 839, 12 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 921 (1907).
35. Leflar, Community Property and Conflict of Laws (1933) 21 CALIM. L.
REv. 221, 228.
36. A sharp d. tinction must be drawn between actual ownership and mere
incidents of ownership. The latter are always subject to the law of the place where
the res is for the time being located. They include such matters as the use to which
an admitted owner may put his property, the completeness of his control over it,
inheritance of it, and the share which a spouse takes in it on the death of the owner.
Minor v. Cardwell, 37 Mo. 350 (1866). For example, in common law states a wife
takes dower in her husband's separately owned personalty on his death; in com-
munity property states she does not. So if a husband's separate property is moved
from Missouri to California, it remains his separate property, but California is free
to hold that his wife takes no dower in it. In re Estate of Drishaus, 199 Cal. 369, 249
Pac. 515 (1926). Of course the situs usually refers this particular matter to the
law of the domicile. Supra note 19.
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tain preexistent interests should automatically cease, or should not be recog-
nized as validly existent, when the chattel came within the state, without
any new transaction concerning the chattel. Would this be permissible under
the federal Constitution?
Undoubtedly this would amount to depriving the former owner of his
property. When the chattel was in State X, he had a property interest in it;
when he took it, or allowed it to be taken, into State Y, he would lose his
property. Is this deprivation of property accomplished by due process of law?
It is impossible to discover anything even remotely resembling the normal
processes of the law in connection with it. There is certainly no judicial pro-
ceeding. There is no consensual or other transaction between parties to
which the law could attach the effect of creation and relinquishment of in-
terests. All that has happened is that the owner of an interest in a res has
brought the res into the state. It is, of course, thereby subjected to the police
power of the state, and it can even be physically destroyed thereafter if it is
dangerous to the public peace, health or welfare, and certainly the law of
its new situs may control the legal effect of new transactions concerning it,
but to transfer title to it out of one person and into another merely because
the res comes within the borders of the state transcends any known exercise of
the police power. It is impossible to reach any conclusion other than that
such a transfer would violate the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has not as yet, however, had
occasion to pass upon the exact problem.37
TRANSACTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO REMOVAL OF CHATTEL
It may be assumed, then, that a chattel has been brought from State X
into State Y, and that A's prior interest created in State X still persists in
State Y. At this point a new transaction occurs which by the law of State Y
37. In Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139 (1868), New York was required
to give full faith and credit to an Illinois adjudication of the title of an Illinois
chattel. In such cases as Hervey v. R. I. Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664 (1876),
no constitutional issue is presented. The exact problem is most nearly approached
by a line of California cases culminating in Re Thornton, 1 Cal. (2d) 1, 33 P. (2d)
1, 92 A. L. R. 1343 (1934). In order to avoid the unfairness as to dower and cur-
tesy suggested supra note 36, a California statute was enacted providing that all prop-
erty acquired anywhere after marriage, by either spouse, regardless of domicile, which
would have been community property had it been acquired while they were domiciled
in California, should be community property. The statute was finally held to be
invalid as violative of both the due process and the privileges and immunities clauses.
The violation of the latter clause arose from the fact that the statute was deemed
to require non-citizens to relinquish their separate property rights as a condition to
acquiring a domicile in California.
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would operate to put title to the chattel into P, but which by the law of
State X would have no such legal effect, merely leaving the title in A.
The law is very clear that if the prior owner A assented either expressly
or impliedly, to the removal of the chattel into State Y, the law of that state
will determine the effect of the new transaction upon the title to it. This is
so under the general rule that the law of the situs is the governing law. If
the possessor of the chattel (someone other than A) sells it to a bona fide
purchaser P, or P as a creditor of the possessor attaches it in good faith, and
by the law of the situs this operates to put title in P as against A, that is
what happens. The title has passed.38 By the law of several jurisdictions, this
follows from A's failure to record his non-possessory interest in the state to
which he has caused the chattel to be removed3D Some states, however, at-
tach no such significance to a failure to record. They follow the substantive
common law rule that a legal title is unaffected by an unauthorized sale even
to a bona fide purchaser. If that is the law of the state of situs, the subse-
quent transaction has no effect on the title,40 regardless of what the law of
the state from which the chattel was removed might have said. In any event,
it is the law of the state to which the chattel was removed, and in which it
was situated at the time of the transaction, which controls.
38. Cammell v. Sewell, 5 H. & N. (Ex.) 728 (1860); Hervey v. R. I. Locomo-
tive Works, 93 U. S. 664 (1876); Corbett v. Riddle, 209 Fed. 811 (C. C. A. 4th,
1913); Enterprise Optical Mfg. Co. v. Timmer, 71 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 6th,
1934); Johnson v. Sauerman Bros., 243 Ky. 587, 49 S. W. (2d) 331 (1932). For
cases applying the same principle to negotiable instruments, see U. S. v. Guaranty
Tr. Co., 293 U. S. 340 (1934); Weissman v. Banque de Bruxelles, 254 N. Y. 488,
173 N. E. 835 (1930).
39. This appears to be the rule in Missouri generally. Geiser Mfg. Co. v. Todd,
204 S. W. 287 (Mo. App., 1918), 224 S. W. 1006 (1920) (prior Arkansas mortgage
unrecorded in Mo. defeated by later Missouri mortgage); Hollipeter-Shonyo & Co. v.
Maxwell, 205 Mo. App. 357, 224 S. W. 113 (1920) (garage repairman's lien on car
prevails over Arkansas conditional seller's title unrecorded in Missouri); Adamson
v. Fogelstrom, 221 Mo. App. 1243, 300 S. NV. 841 (1927) (Missouri attachment
prevails over Kansas mortgage unrecorded in Missouri). Also see Belestin v. First
Nat. Bk., 177 Mo. App. 300, 164 S. W. 160 (1914), applying the same principle to
a negotiable instrument.
40. Shapard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900; Public Parks Amuse-
ment Co. v. Embree-McLean Carriage Co., 64 Ark. 29, 40 S. W. 582 (1897); Com'l.
Cr. Co. v. Gaiser, 134 Kan. 552, 7 P. (2d) 527 (1932); Langworthy v. Little, 12
Cush. 109 (1853); Cleveland Mach. Works v. Lang, 67 N. H. 348, 31 Atl. 20, 68
A. S. R. 675 (1893). Some extrastate non-possessory interests may not be covered
by the Missouri recording acts, for instance. In such case, the extrastate interest
persists despite the subsequent transaction. Allison v. Bowles, 8 Mo. 346 (1844);
Murray v. Fox, 11 Mo. 555 (1848); Stewart, Sheriff v. Ball's Adm'r., 33 Mo. 154
(1862).
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When the chattel is taken from State X into State Y without the assent
of the prior owner A, there is a greater divergence in the authorities. The
American states may be divided into three groups in reference to their man-
ner of handling this problem. First are the states which hold that foreign-
created titles will not be affected by subsequent transactions even though
the owner did assent to the removal of the chattel; a fortiori, the same result
will be reached if the removal was without his assent.41 The presence or
absence of such assent has no bearing in these states.
The second group of states does attach significance to the absence of
assent. These jurisdictions hold that their recording acts and other rules fav-
oring bona fide purchasers, attaching creditors and the like will have no op-
eration against a prior owner who did not consent to the goods being brought
within the state.42 Missouri falls into this group of states.4 3 It is notable,
however, that the courts of these states regularly reach this result by inter-
preting their recording acts or related rules of law as simply not applying to
chattels thus brought in without the owner's assent. They do not have oc-
casion to say what would be their attitude as to the validity of statutes ex-
pressly subjecting such interests to the local title-destroying laws, since they
find that such statutes have not been enacted, or are not applicable to the
facts of the particular case before the court.
In the third group of states the local laws protecting bona fide purchasers
are deemed applicable to chattels brought into the state even without a prior
owner's assent. Some of the states in this group (Texas particularly) pro-
41. Supra note 40. See Creelman Lbr. Co. v. Lesh, 73 Ark. 16, 83 S. W. 320
(1904); Wray Bros. v. H. A. White Auto Co., 155 Ark. 153, 244 S. W. 18 (1922);
Mercantile Acc. Co. v. Frank, 203 Cal. 483, 265 Pac. 190, 57 A. L. R. 696 (1928).
42. Struble-Werneke Mot. Co. v. Metropolitan Sec. Corp., 93 Ind. App. 416,
178 N. E. 460 (1931); Franklin Motor Car Co. v. Hamilton, 113 Me. 63, 92 At.
1001 (1915); Walker Motor Exch. v. Lindberg, 86 Mont. 513, 284 Pac. 270 (1930);
Cooper v. Phila. Worsted Co., 68 N. J. Eq. 622, 60 Atl. 352 (1905); Hart v. Oliver
Farm Equipment Sales Co., 37 N. M. 267, 21 P. (2d) 96, 87 A. L. R. 962 (1933);
Goetschius v. Brightman, 245 N. Y. 186, 156 N. E. 660 (1927). The most complete
collection of the cases appears in Carnahan, Tangible Property and the Conflict of
Laws (1935) 2 UNIV. oF CH. L. REv. 345.. It is frequently difficult to tell from a
single case whether a state falls within the first or second classification here sug-
gested, since the courts often emphasize the absence of consent even though they
would reach the same result had there been consent to removal.
43. Smith v. Hutchings, 30 Mo. 380 (1860); Nat. Bank of Commerce v.
Morris, 114 Mo. 255, 21 S. W. 511, 19 L. R. A. 463, 35 A. S. R. 754 (1893); Schmidt
v. Rankin, 193 Mo. 254, 91 S. W. 78 (1906); Parker-Harris Co. v. Stephens, 205
Mo. App. 373, 224 S. W. 1036 (1920), noted in (1921) 22 U. or Mo. BULL. LAW
SER. 31; Finance Service Corp. v. Kelly, 235 S. IV. 146 (Mo. App. 1921); Asso-
ciates Inv. Co. v. Froelich, 34 S. W. (2d) 987 (Mo. App. 1931). And see Metzger
v. Columbia Terminals Co., 227 Mo. App. 135, 50 S. W. (2d) 680 (1932).
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tect all bona fide purchasers from the moment the chattel is brought into the
state,44 some protect such purchasers only if the non-possessory extrastate
interest remains unrecorded in the second state for a certain length of time'5
or for a certain length of time after the prior owner learns of the chattel's
presence at the new place,48 some protect purchasers only as against inter-
ests which are also unrecorded in the state from which the chattel was re-
moved,4 7 one state on a theory of supposed "comity" protects bona fide pur-
chasers only when the prior interest thereby defeated arose in some state
which protects all bona fide purchasers under the same circumstances, 4  and
44. Farmer v. Evans, 111 Tex. 283, 233 S. W. 101 (1921); Consol. Garage
Co. v. Chambers, 111 Tex, 293, 231 S. W. 1072 (1921), aff'd, 210 S. W. 565 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1919); Sanger v. Jesse French Piano Co., 21 Tex. Civ. App. 523, 52 S. W.
621 (1899); Willys'Overland Co. v. Chapman, 206 S. W. 978 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918);
Gen'l. Motors Acc. Corp. v. Fowler, 36 S. W. (2d) 589 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). Texas
is careful to apply its rule only when the chattel is actually in Texas when the sale
to a bona fide purchaser occurs. Kennedy v. Nat. Cash Reg. Co., 279 S. W. 505 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1925).
Other states usually cited as reaching the same result are Louisiana, Michigan,
Pennsylvania and Illinois. 11 C. J. 426, notes 14-17. See Walworth v. Harris, 129 U.
S. 355 (1889) (a Louisiana case); Devant v. Pecou, 13 La. App. 594, 128 So. 700
(1930); Fuller v. Webster, 5 Boyce 538, 95 Atl. 335 (1915); (Pennsylvania law
applied, as lex sitae); Judy v. Evans, 109 Ill. App. 154 (1903). See cases cited in
Carnahan, Tangible Property and the Conflict of Laws, supra note 42, at 378. Pos-
sibly Virginia belongs in this group also. See Applewhite Co. v. Etheridge, 210 N. C.
433, 187 S. E. 588 (1936) (Virginia law applied, as lex sitae.); Note (1937) 23 VA.
L. REv. 480. For the same result in a case involving a negotiable instrument, see
Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank, [19051 1 K.B. 677, Cf. Beale, Jurisdiction over
Title of Absent Owner in a Chattel (1927) 40 HARV. L. REv. 805, 807.
45. Professor Carnahan lists Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon and Washington as having recording acts of this type. Supra note 42, at 380.
46. By the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, § 14, and the Uniform Chattel
Mortgage Act, § 37, the owner of the non-possessory interest is given ten days in
which to record after he receives notice of the filing district to which the goods
have been removed. Ten jurisdictions are listed as having adopted the Condi-
tional Sales Act. They are Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvvania, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Alaska. 2 UNIF. LAw
ANN. (Supp. 1935) 5. Apparently no states have adopted the Chattel Mortgage
Act. See Thayer Merc. Co. v. Milltown Bank, 98 N. J. L. 29, 119 At. 94 (1922);
Universal Cr. Co. v. Finn, 212 Wis. 601, 250 N. W. 391 (1933), for holdings that a
bona fide purchaser prevails over a conditional seller who did not assent to removal
of the chattel and who fails to record within ten days as required by the Act.
47. This appears to be the Colorado rule. For cases in which the Colorado
bona fide purchaser prevailed over the extrastate "secret lien," see Turnbull v. Cole,
70 Colo. 364, 201 Pac. 887 (1921), 25 A. L. R. 1149 (1923); Com'l. Cr. Co. v. Hig-
bee, 92 Colo. 346, 20 P. (2d) 543 (1933); Amer. Eq. Assur. Co. v. Hall Cadillac
Co., 93 Colo. 186, 24 P. (2d) 980 (1933); whereas in Flora v. Julesburg Mot. Co.,
69 Colo. 238, 193 Pac. 545 (1920), and Mosko v. Matthews, 87 Colo. 55, 284 Pac.
1021 (1930), the non-possessory interest was recorded in the state from which the
chattel was removed, therefore deemed not a "secret lien," and the prior owner
prevailed over the Colorado bona fide purchaser. See Note (1934) 6 RocKY MTN.
L. REv. 221.
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several states protect bona fide holders of liens given to tradesmen or me-
chanics to secure payment for value added to the chattel at the request of the
possessor.
49
The reasons which induce a state to protect bona fide purchasers as
against prior owners are quite clear, whether one agrees with them or not.
They are the same reasons which produced the market overt in other days,
reasons fostered by traders in the marketplace whose interest lies in the se-
curity of transactions as opposed, frequently, to the interest of less active
property-owning groups in the security of ownership. The prevalence of one
interest over the other is a matter of the dominant public policy of the time
and place, as it makes itself felt in legislatures and courts,50 and whichever
interest dominates will have to be respected by the lawyer.
Professor Beale has urged that the state to which a chattel is removed
without the assent of the owner of an interest therein is without "jurisdic-
tion" to affect the non-assenting owner's interest.51 Since the word "jurisdic-
tion" when used in this connection is commonly thought of as a synonym for
"power" to act or attach legal consequences to the facts, and since on these
facts the only limitation on the "power" of the state to which the chattels
were removed would be imposed by the federal constitution,52 it was prob-
ably thought by some that Professor Beale meant that such a state (like
Texas) was depriving the non-assenting owner of his property without power
to do so, so that the purported deprivation was a nullity. But Professor
Beale was careful to explain that he did not mean this, that he used the word
"jurisdiction" in the sense of "the power of a state to create rights which
under the principles of the common law will be recognized as valid in other
48. Union Sec. Co. v. Adams, 33 Wyo. 45, 236 Pac. 513, 50 A. L. R. 23 (1925).
49. For example, garagemen's liens for car repairs: Willys-Overland Co. v.
Evans, 104 Kan. 632, 180 Pac. 235 (1919); Universal Cr. Co. v. Marks, 164 Md.
130, 163 At. 810 (1933). And see Com'l. Banking Corp. v. Berkowitz, 104 Pa.
Sup. 523, 159 Atl. 214 (1932) (New Jersey lien); Walworth v. Harris, 129 U. S.
355 (1889) (in which a Louisiana factor's lien cut off a prior Arkansas landlord's
lien.)
50. Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction (1932) 6 TULANE L.
REv. 589; Falconbridge, Contract and Conveyance in The Conflict of Laws (1933)
81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 661, 679.
51. Beale, Jurisdiction over Title of Absent Owner in a Chattel (1927) 40
HARV. L. REv. 805. See also 1 BEALE, CONFLIcT OF LAWS (1935) §§ 50.2ff. This
view was taken in section 52 of the Tentative and Proposed Final Drafts of the
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, but that section was omitted from the final draft.
52. Presumably by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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states,5 3 which suggests that his "lack of jurisdiction" is equivalent to a kind
of "non-conclusive jurisdiction" by which a state has constitutional power to
act though its exercise of the power need not be recognized elsewhere. 5'
That jurisdiction in the sense of constitutional power does exist en-
abling an American state to change or destroy the title interests of an absent
owner of a chattel brought into the state without his assent can scarcely be
denied today. Professor Carnahan analyzed the cases two years ago, reach-
ing that definite conclusion,55 and subsequent authorities bear him out. A
full half of the states in the Union actually exercise the jurisdiction in one
way or another.56 The concept of market overt, upon which the jurisdiction
is based, has been accepted by the common law for centuries.57 The Com-
missioners of Uniform State Laws were sufficiently certain of the jurisdiction
to include provision for its exercise in two of their Acts.5 8 New titles by ad-
verse possession have always been acquired regardless of the assent of the dis-
possessed owner to the presence of the chattel at the place where the adverse
possession occurred. 59 Forfeiture to the state of chattels being used in viola-
tion of law is enforceable to destroy titles of non-resident owners who assent
neither to the illegal use of the chattel nor its removal.60 All authorities agree
that jurisdictional facts should be as few and simple as possible. The fre-
53. Beale, op. cit. supra, note 51, at 811. And see Harding, Josepk Henry
Beale: Pioneer (1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 145. The American Law Institute adopts
the same definition of "jurisdiction," RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 42;
but follows it by the statement that, "Under the Constitution of the United States,
the States cannot create interests if they have no jurisdiction." Id., § 43. This iden-
tity of "jurisdiction" with "constitutional power" produces a terminology designed
to avoid confusion, but it at least was not presented in Professor Beale's original
article, and is not applied by the American Law Institute to the case of chattels
removed without the owner's assent.
54. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 42.2. Such "non-conclusive jurisdic-
tion" apparently does exist within the the limits of the United States Constitution.
Leflar, Jurisdiction to Grant Divorces (1935) 7 Miss. L. Jou. 445, 464.
55. Carnahan, Tangible Property and the Conflict of Laws (1935) 2 U. OF CHI.
L. REv. 345, 355. See also Note (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 1293.
56. Supra notes 44 to 49, inclusive.
57. The protection of purchasers in market overt was substantially established
in English law by 1473, and was firmly settled by 1596. See 5 HoLDswORTH, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW (1924) 110.
58. Supra note 46.
59. Howell v. Hair 15 Ala. 194 (1849); Newcombe v. Leavitt, 22 Ala. 631
(1853); Smith, Adm'r. of Taylor v. Newby, 13 Mo. 159 (1850); Alexander v. Tor-
rence, 6 Jones L. 260 (1858). And see Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361 (1826);
Brown v. Brown, 5 Ala. 508 (1843); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934)
§ 259.
60. Pennington v. Comm., 127 Va. 803, 102 S. E. 758 (1920); Buchholz v.
Comm., 127 Va. 794, 102 S. E. 760 (1920); Comm. v. Studebaker Coupe, 86 Pa.
Sup. 532 (1925); Comm. v. Overland Sedan, 90 Pa. Sup. 376 (1927).
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quent difficulty of proving assent or non-assent as a fact, especially in cases
where the owner of an interest in a chattel such as an automobile gives pos-
session of it to another without express instructions or agreement as to where
it is to be taken or used, 60a indicates that assent to removal is not the type
of thing which should be deliberately adopted as a jurisdictional fact unless
the authorities absolutely require it. Obviously they do not. The conclusion
is almost inevitable that jurisdiction in the federal constitutional sense de-
pends only upon the physical presence of the -es, though the exercise of the
jurisdiction will frequently depend upon other factors.
NON-RECOGNITION OF VALID TITLES
The problem suggested at the beginning of this article may now be re-
stated. A owns a title interest in a chattel in Arkansas (or in Missouri). The
chattel is wrongly taken without A's assent into Texas, where it is sold to a
bona fide purchaser P, who by Texas law thereby acquires a title good as
against A and all other prior owners. P then takes the chattel to Missouri (or
to Arkansas or any other state) by whose law P would not on these facts
have acquired good title as against A."' A there brings action to recover the
chattel. May the Missouri court apply its own Conflict of Laws rule and hold
in favor of A, or is it bound to respect the Texas rule favoring P?
A major premise possibly useful in answering this question may be taken
as established. It is that the mere removal of a chattel across state lines,
without any subsequent transactions concerning the chattel, cannot operate
to take pre-existent valid title interests out of one person and put them into
another. This would amount to taking property without due process of law."°
The usefulness of this possible major premise depends upon the availability
of a suitable minor premise, towit, that P in Texas did acquire such a valid
title interest.
Courts faced with this problem have a few times refused to recognize
P's Texas title. The Arizona court did this in Forgan v. Bainbridge.63 In that
case, A's title was acquired in Illinois, from which state the chattel was with-
out A's assent taken to Texas and sold to P, then removed to Arizona where
A sought to recover it from P. In allowing recovery the court said:
60a. For illustration of this difficulty, see the varying interpretations of Fuller
v. Webster, infra note 68.
61. Supra notes 42, 43.
62. Supra p. 178.
63. 34 Ariz. 408, 274 Pac. 155 (1928).
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"... we do not question the interpretation placed by the Texas
courts on the bill of sale from Tallmadge to Bibb [P], nor that, in
Texas, it gave the latter a good title against the mortgagee [A], any
more than we question that the Illinois mortgage gave, in that state,
a right superior to that of defendants. We are called on merely to
determine which title is entitled to priority under our laws, and, on
the grounds that the Illinois title was acquired in a manner in har-
mony with our law, and the Texas title is one repudiated by us, and
that Illinois grants to us the reciprocity which Texas denies, we
think a true interpretation of the rule of comity requires that we
recognize the priority of the Illinois title.
4
There was a strong dissenting opinion to the effect that since P's Texas title
was recognizedly a valid one necessarily superseding A's prior title, the Ari-
zona court could not properly displace it.
One other well known case might be cited as reaching the same result.
It is Edgerly v. Bush.65 In it, A's chattel was taken without his assent from
New York to Canada and there sold to the bona fide purchaser P, in market
overt. The chattel was brought back into New York, then again taken to Can-
ada. Both A and P were domiciled in New York. The New York court held
for A in his action against P's assignee for conversion. The reasoning in the
case was vague, 6 consisting principally of references to "comity" and the now
obsolete notion that the legal effect of transactions concerning chattels is
controlled by the law of the domicile of the owner. The case does not clearly
recognize that it was destroying an existent title interest in the chattel,
rather applying the law of New York to reach the conclusion that no title
ever arose in P at all. Yet this case and the Arizona decision are representa-
tive of the only discovered judicial authority for non-recognition of a title
such as P's.
On the other hand there are several decisions in which other states have
recognized the validity of titles such as P's acquired in jurisdictions such as
Texas. Some of the earliest cases involved titles acquired by adverse pos-
session. A chattel would be stolen from A in State X, removed surreptitiously
64. 34 Ariz. 408, 419, 274 Pac. 155, 159 (1928). Accord, Meyer v. Equitable
Cr. Co., 174 Ark. 575, 297 S. W. 846 (1927) (chattel taken from Arkansas to Texas
to Arkansas.) And see Metzger v. Columbia Terminals Co., 227 Mo. App. 135, 50
S. W. (2d) 680 (1932). In the latter case, the chattel was taken from Missouri to
Pennsylvania, then returned to Missouri by public carrier. A lien which the court
assumes would by Pennsylvania law have arisen in favor of the carrier was not
enforced in Missouri.
65. 81 N. Y. 199 (1880).
66. Professor Beale says of the reasoning: "The opinion of Chief Judge Folger
is not a satisfactory one. It is full of curious and obsolete notions, and avoids any
specification of reasons." Beale, Jurisdiction over Title of Absent Owner in a Chattel(1927) 40 H~Av. L. REv. 805.
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to State Y and there held adversely by P for the period set by the revelant
statute of limitations of State Y. Thereafter the chattel would be removed
by P to a third state, or back to State X, and there discovered and claimed
by A. It was regularly held that P's title acquired in State Y would be re-
spected, even though he might not have acquired such a title had the adverse
possession occurred in State X.67 In some cases the interests of bona fide
purchasers and lienholders acquired in states like Texas have been in other
states protected against prior owners in the position of A.""
In none of the cases, however, has the problem been dealt with as one
involving federal constitutional limitations. The courts in each case have
purported to decide the problem purely on the basis of the local law of Con-
flict of Laws. This attitude can be logically supported only on a theory that
the title created by the law of the state to which the chattel was removed
without the prior owner's consent was not an absolutely valid title, but only
a kind of conditional title, one which could be recognized or refused recogni-
tion at will. Such a title would not receive the protection of the due process
clause, and the title owner could permissibly be deprived of his property free-
67. Howell v. Hair, 15 Ala. 194 (1849); Newcombe v. Leavitt, 22 Ala. 631(1853); Alexander v. Torrence, 6 Jones L. 260 (1858). Accord, RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) §§ 259, 260; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws (1935) § 260.1.
68. Fuller v. Webster, 5 Boyce 538, 95 Atl. 335 (1915), is the best known case
of this type. See discussion of this case in Forgan v. Bainbridge, 34 Ariz. 408, 424,
274 Pac. 155, 161 (1928), by Ross, C. J., dissenting. In Fuller v. Webster, the
chattel was wrongly taken from Massachusetts to Pennsylvania and there sold to
a bona fide purchaser P, whose title, by Pennsylvania law, was superior to that of
the prior owner A. The chattel was then removed by P to Delaware where A
brought replevin for it. The Delaware court held for P, even though by Delaware
law P's title would not have been good, thus respecting the title acquired in Penn-
sylvania. The case was affirmed without opinion by a divided court in 6 Boyce 297,
99 At. 1069 (1916). Professor Beale approves the case as one in which A, by not
objecting, consented to the removal of the chattel from Massachusetts to Penn-
sylvania. Beale, Jurisdiction over Title of Absent Owner in a Chattel (1927) 40
H.av. L. REV. 805, 808. There is, however, no more in the facts of the case to
indicate such an implied consent than there is in the Texas cases, supra note 44.
Applewhite Co. v. Etheridge, 210 N. C. 433, 187 S. E. 588 (1936), is a case
in which a chattel was removed from North Carolina to Virginia, there sold to a bonafide purchaser, then returned to North Carolina, where it was held that the pur-
chaser's Virginia title prevailed even though he would have acquired no title had
North Carolina law prevailed. As is pointed out in (1937) 50 HARv. L. REv. 522,
the court did not state whether there was assent by the prior owner to the removal
to Virginia or not, but it did decide the case as though the presence or absence of
such assent made no difference, which seems to be the only proper approach to the
problem in view of the Virginia law which, like the law of Texas, apparently makes
nothing turn on such assent. Supra notes 44, 60. And see Bank of Commerce of
Earle v. Tubb, 156 Ark. 487, 247 S. W. 1079 (1923); Com'l. Banking Corp. v. Berko-
witz, 104 Pa. Sup. 523, 159 At. 214 (1932).
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ly. It would be property, yet somehow classified apart from all other property
so as not to fall within the scope of the constitutional guaranties which are
accorded to property interests generally. That would be a strange sort of in-
terest in the American constitutional and common law system of property.
It might even seem that it had been conjured up in a metaphysician's mind
for no other purpose than to explain the phenomenon of this particular group
of cases. Yet it is inevitably the type of title produced by the "non-conclusive
jurisdiction" previously ascribed"9 to a state to which a chattel has been re-
moved without the assent of the owner of an interest therein.
The alternative to this "now you own it, now you don't" type of title is
an ordinary ownership constituting property protected by the due process
clause. No careful theory need be devised to explain this alternative. It is
the sort of thing which normally results when the law of the situs or a res,
determining the effect of a transaction concerning it, creates a title interest
in the res.
Furthermore, this alternative is in keeping with the current policy 0 of
American law to work toward "uniform interstate enforcement of vested
rights," at least in matters having some national significance. The United
States Supreme Court has several times recently made use of the full faith
and credit clause 7' and the due process clause in the federal Constitution to
prevent state courts from nullifying contract rights validly created by the
properly governing law of another state or country.72 The philosophy under-
lying these decisions is indubitably one favoring the protection of rights once
accrued, the elimination of such uncertainties in the ownership of choses in
69. Supra p. 183.
70. The previously mentioned contest of policies between the merchant's
interest in the security of transactions and the propertied man's interest in the
security of vested ownerships (supra note 50) must now be taken to be already
determined by the decision of the state like Texas to put a title in the bona fide
purchaser. That contest might well have been decided the other way, and under
the Conflict of Laws rule in many states would have been otherwise decided. But
in the case under consideration P now has a title acquired in a state like Texas.
71. The possibility that this clause, by its requirement that full faith and
credit be given to the "public acts" (statutes) of the states, might compel extrastate
recognition of titles arising under recording acts and the like has been suggested.
Note (1937) 50 HARv. L. REV. 522. And see Field, Judicial Notice of Public Acts
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (1928) 12 MINN. L. REv. 439; Langmaid,
The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts (1929) 24 ILL. L. REV. 383;
Ross, "Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal System (1936) 20 MINN. L. REv. 140
72. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357 (1918); Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389 (1924); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 (1930);
Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932); Hartford Acc. & Ind.
Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143 (1934); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Yates, U. S. Sup. Ct, Dec. 7, 1936.
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action and defenses thereto as would permit one state to say that a right
exists and another to say that it does not, both regardless of the single law
under which the right arose if it arose at all. The Court has by no means
necessarily indicated that the whole law of Conflict of Laws is being made a
branch of Constitutional law,73 but it has indicated that a state will not be
permitted to disregard accepted common law theories of the law of Conflict
of Laws by applying its own law to destroy74 rights or defenses which exist
altogether under the law of some other state.
It is not difficult to see that the economic and social basis for this philos-
ophy may be as applicable to tangible movable things as to choses in action.
An attitude to the effect that non-recognition of existent titles is undesirable,
that it is not good economic policy for a title to be valid in one state but in-
valid across the boundary line, would be readily understandable. That atti-
tude would involve a rejection of the concept of "non-conclusive jurisdiction"
as applied to these cases. It would compel the acceptance by every state of
all title interests created by the law of the state of situs of a chattel, with
change in the title possible only by reason of new transactions concerning the
chattel after its removal.
73. Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law?
(1931) 15 MINN. L. REv. 161. Also see Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of
Vested Rights (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 656; Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court
to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 H~Av. L. REV.
533.
74. This is of course a different matter from merely refusing, for reasons of
local public policy, to enforce an admittedly valid foreign executory claim. Such
refusal is freely allowed, and involves no deprivation of property since the right
remains as valid as ever and may still be taken to some other forum for enforcement.
See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 612; Lorenzen, Territoriality,
Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. JOUR. 736; Goodrich,
Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts (1930) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 156.
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